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The interactive game theoretical approach to tactics and behavioral self-organization
is developed. Though it uses the interactive game theoretical formalization of di-
alogues as psycholinguistic phenomena, the crucial role is played by the essentially
new concept of a tactical game. Applications to the perception processes and related
subjects (memory, recollection, image understanding, imagination) are discussed to-
gether with relations to the computer vision and pattern recognition (the dynamical
formation of patterns and perception models during perception as a result of its
self-organization) and computer games (modelling of the tactical behavior and self-
organization, tactical RPG and elaboration of new tactical game techniques). The
appendix is devoted to the operative computer games and the user programming of
operative units in a multi-user online operative computer game.
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Introduction
The mathematical formalism of interactive games, which extends one of ordinary
games (see e.g.[1]) and is based on the concept of an interactive control, was recently
proposed by the author [2] to take into account the complex composition of controls
of a real human person, which are often complicated couplings of his/her cognitive
and known controls with the unknown subconscious behavioral reactions. The goal
of this article is to describe the tactical phenomena and behavioral self-organization
in terms of interactive games. Though the crucial role is played by the interactive
game theoretical concepts of dialogues and verbalizable games [3], the proposed
constructions are essentially new as ideologically as technically. However, it should
be specially emphasized that tactics is derived from the interactivity, and roughly
speaking, the first may be thought as just an art to manipulate the Unknown, which
manifests itself in the least, without making it known completely1. Otherwords,
besides the reason tactics includes the sphere of “another effort of mind”, which
is important not only in practice but also in theory2. And because this sphere is
important for all moments of our life it is not strange that virtually all known forms
of human activity such as scientific researches and economics, sport or military
actions, fine or martial arts, literature, music and theatre, psychotherapy and even
magic may be regarded as certain tactical games, which therefore have the universal
meaning.
1 To my mind this is very reasonable if the ecological approach to the Unknown is adopted
and we are not willing the least to be written by the golden letters of our Knowledge into the Red
Book of the Universe.
2 The simplest explanation why the transition from interactivity to tactics is necessary is that
the description of interactive process is a tactical procedure (see e.g.[4]), otherwords, interactive
games have their descriptors among tactical games whereas the class of tactical games contains
all their descriptors and therefore is self-consistent. It is essential to mark that the description of
any interactive phenomena is interactive itself.
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It is well-known that the world around us is much deeper than what we see, are
able to perceive or even to comprehend, so it is essential not only to understand
the known forms of human (individual and collective) activity in terms of tactical
games but also to try to unravel the abstract mathematical foundations of all tac-
tical phenomena and thus to extend the sphere of tactical activity presumably into
the abstract intelligible direction (certainly, completely conserving its practical ori-
entation). Thereas the first purpose is the goal of the present article, the least will
be discussed in the forthcoming one devoted to the game theoretical description of
dialectics.
The article is organized in the following manner. Two first paragraphs are in-
troductory. They are devoted to the general interactive games and the dialogues,
respectively. The third paragraph is devoted to the new concept of tactical games.
Interactive game theoretical models of behavioral self-organizations are discussed
in the fourth paragraph. Other paragraphs contains special topics: in the firth
paragraph the attention is concentrated on tactics and behavioral self-organization
constructed for the perception games and the kaleidoscope-roulettes in particular,
the sixth one is devoted to the tactical interaction, tactical synthesis and tactical
localization of control systems.
The article includes an appendix, where the operative computer games and the
user programming of operative units in a multi-user online operative computer game
are discussed.
The article is organized as series of definitions supplied by the clarifying remarks,
which together describe the entire construction.
I. Interactive games
First of all, let us expose the basic principles of interactive games in general.
1.1. Interactive systems and games.
Definition 1 [2]. An interactive system (with n interactive controls) is a control
system with n independent controls coupled with unknown or incompletely known
feedbacks (the feedbacks as well as their couplings with controls are of a so com-
plicated nature that their can not be described completely). An interactive game
is a game with interactive controls of each player.
Below we shall consider only deterministic and differential interactive systems.
In this case the general interactive system may be written in the form:
(1) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un),
where ϕ characterizes the state of the system and ui are the interactive controls:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), [ϕ(τ)]|τ6t),
i.e. the independent controls u◦i (t) coupled with the feedbacks on [ϕ(τ)]|τ6t. One
may suppose that the feedbacks are integrodifferential on t.
However, it is reasonable to consider the differential interactive games, whose
feedbacks are purely differential. It means that
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)).
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A reduction of general interactive games to the differential ones via the introducing
of the so-called intention fields was described in [2]. Below we shall consider the
differential interactive games only if the opposite is not specified explicitely.
The interactive games introduced above may be generalized in the following
ways.
The first way, which leads to the indeterminate interactive games, is based on
the idea that the pure controls u◦i (t) and the interactive controls ui(t) should not be
obligatory related in the considered way. More generally one should only postulate
that there are some time-independent quantities Fα(ui(t), u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t))
for the independent magnitudes ui(t) and u
◦
i (t). Such claim is evidently weaker
than one of Def.1. For instance, one may consider the inverse dependence of the
pure and interactive controls: u◦i (t) = u
◦
i (ui(t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)).
The inverse dependence of the pure and interactive controls has a nice psycholog-
ical interpretation. Instead of thinking of our action consisting of the conscious and
unconscious parts and interpreting the least as unknown feedbacks which “dress”
the first, one is able to consider our action as a single whole whereas the act of
consciousness is in the extraction of a part which it declares as its “property”. So
interpreted the function u◦i (ui, ϕ, . . . , ϕ
(k)) realizes the “filtering” procedure.
The second way, which leads to the coalition interactive games, is based on
the idea to consider the games with coalitions of actions and to claim that the
interactive controls belong to such coalitions. In this case the evolution equations
have the form
(2) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, v1, . . . , vm),
where vi is the interactive control of the i-th coalition. If the i-th coalition is defined
by the subset Ii of all players then
vi = vi(ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t), u◦j |j ∈ Ii).
Certainly, the intersections of different sets Ii may be non-empty so that any player
may belong to several coalitions of actions. Def.1 gives the particular case when
Ii = {i}.
The coalition interactive games may be an effective tool for an analysis of the
collective decision making in the real coalition games that spread the applicability
of the elaborating interactive game theory to the diverse problems of sociology.
Remark 1. One is able to consider interactive games of discrete time in the similar
manner.
Remark 2. If one suspect that the explicit dependence of the feedbacks on the
derivatives of ϕ is not correct because they are determined via the evolution equa-
tions governed by the interactive controls, it is reasonable to use the inverse depen-
dence of pure and interactive controls.
1.2. The ε-representations. Interactive games are games with incomplete infor-
mation by their nature. However, this incompleteness is in the unknown feedbacks,
not in the unknown states. The least situation is quite familiar to specialists in
game theory and there is a lot of methods to have deal with it. For instance, the
unknown states are interpreted as independent controls of the virtual players and
some muppositions on their strategies are done. To transform interactive games into
the games with an incomplete information on the states one can use the following
trick, which is called the ε-representation of the interactive game.
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Definition 2. The ε-representation of the differential interactive game is a repre-
sentation of the interactive controls ui(t) in the form
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . .ϕ
(k)(t); εi(t))
with the known function ui of its arguments u
◦
i , ϕ, . . . , ϕ
(k) and εi, whereas
εi(t) = εi(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t)
is the unknown function of u◦i and ϕ, . . . , ϕ
(k).
Remark 3. The derivatives of ϕ may be excluded from the feedbacks in the way
described above.
Remark 4. One is able to consider the ε-representations of the indeterminate and
coalition interactive games.
εi are interpreted as parameters of feedbacks and, thus, characterize the internal
existential states of players. It motivates the notation ε. Certainly, ε-parameters
are not really states being the unknown functions of the states and pure controls,
however, one may sometimes to apply the standard procedures of the theory of
games with incomplete information on the states. For instance, it is possible to re-
gard εi as controls of the virtual players. The na¨ıvely introduced virtual players only
double the ensemble of the real ones in the interactive games but in the coalition
interactive games the collective virtual players are observed. More sophisticated
procedures generate ensembles of virtual players of diverse structure.
Precisely, if the derivatives of ϕ are excluded from the feedbacks (at least, from
the interactive controls ui as functions of the pure controls, states and the ε-
parameters) the evolution equation will have the form
(3) ϕ˙(t) = Φ(ϕ, u1(u
◦
1(t), ϕ(t); ε1(t)), . . . , un(u
◦
n(t), ϕ(t); εn(t))),
so it is consistent to regard the equations as ones of the controlled system with
the ordinary controls u1, . . . , un, ε1, . . . , εn. One may consider a new game postu-
lating that these controls are independent. Such game will be called the ordinary
differential game associated with the ε-representation of the interactive game.
1.3. Hidden interactivity of ordinary differential games [5]. Let us consider
an arbitrary ordinary differential game with the evolution equations
ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un),
where ϕ characterizes the state of the system and ui are the ordinary controls.
Let us fix a player. For simplicity of notations we shall suppose that it is the first
one. As a rule the players have their algorithms of predictions of the behaviour
of other players. For a fixed moment t0 of time let us consider the prediction of
the first player for the game. It consists of the predicted controls u◦[t0];i(t) (t > t0;
i ≥ 2) of all players and the predicted evolution of the system ϕ◦[t0](t). Let us fix
∆t and consider the real and predicted controls for the moment t0+∆t. Of course,
they may be different because other players use another algorithms for the game
prediction. One may interpret the real controls ui(t) (t = t0 +∆t; i ≥ 2) of other
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players as interactive ones whereas the predicted controls u◦[t0];i(t) as pure ones, i.e.
to postulate their relation in the form:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
[t−∆t];i(t);ϕ
◦
[t0]
(τ)|τ ≤ t).
In particular, the feedbacks may be either reduced to differential form via the
introducing of the intention fields or simply postulated to be differential. Thus, we
constructed an interactive game from the initial ordinary game. One may use ϕ(τ)
as well as ϕ◦[t0](τ) in the feedbacks.
Note that the controls of the first player may be also considered as interactive if
the corrections to the predictions are taken into account when controls are chosen.
The obtained construction may be used in practice to make more adequate pre-
dictions. Namely, a posteriori analysis of the differential interactive games allows to
make the short-term predictions in such games [6]. One should use such predictions
instead of the initial ones. Note that at the moment t0 the first player knows the
pure controls of other players at the interval [t0, t0 + ∆t] whereas their real free-
dom is interpreted as an interactivity of their controls ui(t). So it is reasonable to
choose ∆t not greater than the admissible time depth of the short-term predictions.
Estimations for this depth were proposed in [6].
Na¨ıvely, the proposed idea to improve the predictions is to consider deviations of
the real behaviour of players from the predicted ones as a result of the interactivity,
then to make the short-term predictions taking the interactivity into account and,
thus, to receive the corrections to the initial predictions. Such corrections may be
regarded as “psychological” though really they are a result of different methods of
predictions used by players.
Remark 5. The interpretation of the ordinary differential game as an interactive
game also allows to perform the strategical analysis of interactive games. In-
deed, let us consider an arbitrary differential interactive game A. Specifying its
ε-representation one is able to construct the associated ordinary differential game
B with the doubled number of players. Making some predictions in the game B
one transform it back into an interactive game C. Combination of the strategical
long-term predictions in the game B with the short-term predictions in C is often
sufficient to obtain the adequate strategical prognosis for A.
Remark 6. The interpretation of the ordinary differential game as an interactive
game is especially useful in situations, when the goals of players are not known
precisely to each other and some more or less rough suppositions are made.
II. Dialogues and verbalizable games
2.1. Dialogues. Let us now expose the interactive game formalism for a descrip-
tion of dialogues as psycholinguistic phenomena [3]. First of all, note that one is
able to consider interactive games of discrete time as well as interactive games of
continuous time above.
Defintion 3A (the na¨ıve definition of dialogues) [3]. The dialogue is a 2-
person interactive game of discrete time with intention fields of continuous time.
The states and the controls of a dialogue correspond to the speech whereas the
intention fields describe the understanding.
Let us give the formal mathematical definition of dialogues now.
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Definition 3B (the formal definition of dialogues) [3]. The dialogue is a
2-person interactive game of discrete time of the form
(4) ϕn = Φ(ϕn−1, ~vn, ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn).
Here ϕn = ϕ(tn) are the states of the system at the moments tn (t0 < t1 < t2 <
. . .<tn<. . . ), ~vn=~v(tn)=(v1(tn), v2(tn)) are the interactive controls at the same
moments; ξ(τ) are the intention fields of continuous time with evolution equations
(5) ξ˙(t) = Ξ(ξ(t), ~u(t)),
where ~u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t)) are continuous interactive controls with ε–represented
couplings of feedbacks:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ξ(t); εi(t)).
The states ϕn and the interactive controls ~vn are certain known functions of the
form
(6)
ϕn =ϕn(~ε(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn =~vn(~u
◦(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn).
Note that the most nontrivial part of mathematical formalization of dialogues
is the claim that the states of the dialogue (which describe a speech) are certain
“mean values” of the ε–parameters of the intention fields (which describe the un-
derstanding).
Important. The definition of dialogue may be generalized on arbitrary number of
players and below we shall consider any number n of them, e.g. n = 1 or n = 3,
though it slightly contradicts to the common meaning of the word “dialogue”.
2.2. The verbalization of interactive games. An embedding of dialogues into
the interactive game theoretical picture generates the reciprocal problem: how to
interpret an arbitrary differential interactive game as a dialogue. Such interpreta-
tion will be called the verbalization.
Definition 4 [3]. A differential interactive game of the form
ϕ˙(t) = Φ(ϕ(t), ~u(t))
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), ϕ˙(t), ϕ¨(t), . . . ϕ
(k)(t); εi(t))
is called verbalizable if there exist a posteriori partition t0<t1<t2<. . .< tn<. . .
and the integrodifferential functionals
(7)
ωn(~ε(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn(~u
◦(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
such that
(8) ωn = Ω(ωn−1, vn;ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn).
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The verbalizable differential interactive games realize a dialogue in sense of Def.3.
Remark 7. One may include ωn explicitely into the evolution equations for ϕ
ϕ˙(τ) = Φ(ϕ(τ), ~u(τ);ωn), τ ∈ [tn, tn+1].
as well as into the feedbacks and their couplings.
The main heuristic hypothesis is that all differential interactive games “which
appear in practice” are verbalizable. The verbalization means that the states of a
differential interactive game are interpreted as intention fields of a hidden dialogue
and the problem is to describe such dialogue completely. If a differential interactive
game is verbalizable one is able to consider many linguistic (e.g. the formal grammar
of a related hidden dialogue) or psycholinguistic (e.g. the dynamical correlation of
various implications) aspects of it.
During the verbalization it is a problem to determine the moments ti. A way
to the solution lies in the structure of ε-representation. Let the space E of all
admissible values of ε-parameters be a CW-complex. Then ti are just the moments
of transition of the ε-parameters to a new cell.
2.3. Psycholinguistic encoding/decoding of dialogues. Let’s now describe
one practically valuable procedure. If one has a dialogue it is possible to consider it
as a verbalizable game and, hence, as an interactive game. Then one is able to forget
the initial dialogue structure of this game and to make an attempt to verbalize it.
Certainly, a different dialogue may be obtained in such way. This procedure will be
called the psycholinguistic encoding of the initial dialogue, whereas the reciprocal
one will be called the psycholinguistic decoding.
In practice, the psycholinguistic encoding/decoding may include the change of
the communication medium, e.g. the phonic-verbal dialogue may be encoded as
visual-figurative one (the illustration) and vice versa (the ecphrasis). The analysis
of psycholinguistic encoding/decoding may be useful for a clarification of nature of
the speech-script dualism of language as well as for an understanding of linguistic
aspects of various forms of art such as dance, martial arts, etc.
III. Tactical games
Tactics as it will be defined below is derived from two independent concepts: the
parametric interactive games and external controls on one hand and the comments
to dialogues on another hand.
3.1. Parametric interactive games and external controls. An interactive
game may depend on the additional paramaters. Such dependence is of two forms.
First, parameters may appear in the evolution equations:
(9A) ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, u1, u2, . . . , un;λ).
Here, λ is a collective notation for parameters. Second, parameters may appear in
feedbacks:
(9B) ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ϕ(t), . . . , ϕ
(k)(t);λ).
The dependence of ui on λ is either unknown (incompletely known) or known.
The least means that ∂ui/∂λ may be expressed via ui as a function of other vari-
ables (such expression are integrodifferential on these variables). Both variants of
parametric dependence of interactive game may be combined together.
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The additional paramaters may realize the external controls. In this situation
they depend on time:
λ = λ(t).
In practice, such situation appear in the teaching systems. The parameters are
interpreted as controls of a teacher. This example is rather typical. It shows that
the controls λ(t) may be considered as “slow” whereas the interactive controls ui(t)
as “quick”.
Of course, one is able to introduce the slow controls λ(t), which belong to the
same players as the interactive controls ui(t) or to their coalitions. And, certainly,
the slow controls of discrete time may be considered. One may suspect that the
discrete time controls λn realize a convenient approximation for the slow controls
λ(t), which is timer in practice.
The slow controls may be interactive.
If dependence of ui on λ is known and one consider the ε-representation of
feedbacks it is either postulated that ε-parameters do not depend on λ or claimed
that ∂ε/∂λ is expressed via ε as a function of other arguments.
3.2. Dialogue and comments. Let us consider a n-person dialogue
ωn = Ω(ωn−1, ~vn, ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
with the discrete time interactive controls ~vn and the intention fields governed by
the evolution equations
ξ˙(t) = Ξ(ξ(t), ~u(t)),
where ~u(t) are the continuous interactive controls with ε–represented couplings of
feedbacks:
ui(t) = ui(u
◦
i (t), ξ(t); εi(t)).
The states ϕn and the interactive controls ~vn are expressed as
ωn =ωn(~ε(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn =~vn(~u
◦(τ), ξ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn).
The discrete time comments ϑn to the dialogue are defined recurrently as
(10) ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, ωn, vn).
Comments to the dialogue at the fixed moment tn contain various information
on the dialogue. For instance, one may to raise a problem to restore some features
of a dialogue from certain comments or alternatively what features of a dialogue
may be restored from the fixed comment.
The main difference of the comments ϑn from the states ωn is the absence of
expressions of the first via ~ε(τ) and ξ(τ) (tn−16τ6tn).
Comments are applied to the verbalizable games in the same way.
3.3. Tactical games. Tactical games combine both mechanisms defined above.
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Definition 5. The tactical game is a parametric verbalizable game with comments,
in which the parameters are of discrete time and coincide with the comments.
It is really wonderful that such simple definition is applicable to a very huge class
of phenomena. However, it is so! As it was marked above virtually all known forms
of human activity such as scientific researches and economics, sport or military
actions, fine or martial arts, literature, music and theatre, psychotherapy and even
magic may be regarded as certain tactical games. Trying to improve the model I
have no found any wider concept, whose using is necessary and effective, whereas
the notion of tactical game may describe these phenomena very correctly.
Remark 8. The pairs (vn, ϑn) of discrete time interactive controls and the comments
will be called the tactical actions, whereas the continuous time interactive controls
ui(t) will be called the instant actions. The tactical actions may be involved as in
the evolution equations as in the interactivity.
Remark 9. The description(-construction) of interactive games in sense of [4] is a
tactical procedure.
3.4. Applications to computer games (tactical action games and the
modelling of tactical behavior). Though some computer games claim that they
are tactical it is not so. Really tactics is not involved in the rules of such games and
is accidental. Otherwords, a player may perform the tactical actions but they are
not obligatory. The real actions are instant only and their tactical interpretation
is not substantial. Moreover, artificial players do not perform any really tactical
actions except the actions following a behavioral pattern. The precise definition of a
tactical game allows to create, first, the tactical action games, where tactical actions
are substantial, second, to perform the computer modelling of tactical behavior for
the artificial players. It is not difficult and is very interesting to do. In present,
the author effectively uses the tactical game constructions in elaboration of tactical
computer games. However, the discussion of practical questions is a bit beyond the
aim of this article.
IV. Behavioral self-organization
This paragraph is devoted to the tactical game modelling of the behavioral self-
organization.
4.1. Tactical behavioral self-organization. The tactical properties of play-
ers may change during the game. Note that the tactics is defined by the de-
pendence of the evolution equations and feedbacks on the comments and by the
function Θ, which determines the comments recurrently. One may fix the depen-
dence on the comments and vary the function Θ. The procedures of improvement
of Θ, which goal is an adaptation of a player, form the tactical behavioral self-
organization. Thus, the tactical behavioral self-organization is a form of functional
self-organization. Numerous methods of modelling of such self-organization may
be, therefore, adopted.
Tactical behavioral self-organization should have a lot of real applications in all
forms of human activity, where tactics appears. There are several directions of
such applications: (1) the teaching, (2) the human adaptation and self-regulation
systems, (3) semi-artificial human-computer systems, (4) purely artificial computer
systems. The most of them should be based on the results, which will be obtained
in the computer games.
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4.2. Applications to computer games (artificial intelligence and tactical
self-organization, tactical RPG). Combinations of the artificial intelligence
and tactical self-organization are applicable to computer games. In this way the
truly tactical RPG may be created. Note that virtually all known RPG are not
tactical and therefore do not use the tactical behavioral self-organization (in fact,
they use any behavioral self-organization only episodically, the most elaborated
forms of self-organization are applied by the Japanese but they are not widely
distributed). The author, who actively works in this direction, suspects that it has
a lot of perspectives.
V. Tactics and behavioral self-organization for perception games
This paragraph is devoted to applications of tactical games to the perception
processes and related subjects (memory, recollection, image understanding, imag-
ination) as well as to the computer vision and pattern recognition (the dynamical
formation of patterns and perception models during perception as a result of its
self-organization).
5.1. Perception games and kaleidoscope-roulettes [7]. Perception processes
was understood in the interactive game theoretical terms in the articles [7]. The
main concept is one of the perception game, which is exposed below.
Definition 6. The perception game is a multistage verbalizable game (no matter
finite or infinite) for which the intervals [ti, ti+1] are just the sets. The conditions
of their finishing depends only on the current value of ϕ and the state of ω at
the beginning of the set. The initial position of the set is the final position of the
preceeding one.
Practically, the definition describes the discrete character of the perception and
the image understanding. For example, the goal of a concrete set may be to perceive
or to understand certain detail of the whole image. Another example is a continuous
perception of the moving or changing object.
Note that the definition of perception games is applicable to various forms of
perception, though the most interesting one is the visual perception. The proposed
definition allows to take into account the dialogical character of the image under-
standing and to consider the visual perception, image understanding and the verbal
(and nonverbal) dialogues together. It may be extremely useful for the analysis of
collective perception, understanding and controlling processes in the dynamical
environments – sports, dancings, martial arts, the collective controlling of mov-
ing objects, etc. On the other hand this definition explicates the self-organizing
features of human perception, which may be unraveled by the game theoretical
analysis. And, finally, the definition put a basis for a systematical application of
the linguistic (e.g. formal grammars) and psycholinguistic methods to the image
understanding as a verbalizable interactive game with a mathematical rigor.
Let’s now consider an interesting class of perception games, the kaleidoscope-
rolettes.
The kaleidoscope-roulette is a result of the attempt to combine the kaleidoscope,
one of the simplest and effective visual game, with the roulette essentially using
the elements of randomness and the treatment of resonances. The main idea is
to substitute random sequences of roulette by the quasirandom sequences, which
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may be generated by the interactive kaleidoscope. The obtained formal definition
is below.
Definition 7. Kaleidoscope-roulette is a perception game with a quasirandom se-
quence of quantites {ωn}.
Certainly, the explicit form of functionals (7) is not known to the players.
Many concrete versions of kaleidoscope-roulettes are constructed. Though they
are naturally associated with an entertainment their real applications may be far
beyond it due to their origin and the abstract character of their definition.
Kaleidoscope-roulettes are very interesting due to the resonance phenomena,
which may appear in them. Indeed, though the sequence {ωn} is quasirandom the
equations (8) for them may have the resonance solutions. The resonance means a
dynamical correlation of two quasirandom sequences {vn} and {ωn} whatever ϕ is
realized. In such case the quantities {vn} may be comprehended as “fortune”, what
is not senseless in contrast to the ordinary roulette. However, vn are interactive
controls and their explicit dependence on ~u◦ and ϕ is not known. Nevertheless, one
is able to use a posteriori analysis and short-term predictions based on it (cf.[6])
if the time interval ∆t in the short-term predictions is not less than the interval
tn+1 − tn. To do it one should slightly improve constructions of [6] to take the
discrete-time character of vn into account. It allows to perform the short-term
controlling of the resonances in a kaleidoscope-roulette if they are observed. The
conditions of applicability of short-time predictions to the controlling of resonances
may be expressed in the following form: one should claim that variations of the
interactivity should be slower than the change of sets in the considered multistage
game.
Remark 10. The possibility to control resonances by vn using its short-term predic-
tions does not contradict to its quasirandomness, because vn is quasirandom with
respect to vn−1 but not to ϕ(τ) (τ ∈ [tn, tn+1]).
5.2. Tactics and behavioral self-organization for perception games. Per-
ceptive oracles. Many “representative” mechanisms in perception processes have
the tactical origin. One should include the memory, the recollection, the image
understanding and the imagination. These phenomena may be described in terms
of the tactical perception games. Procedures of tactical behavioral self-organization
may be applied to the memory strengthening, the intensification of creativity during
imagination and other psychological problems.
Below we shall discuss an interesting example related to the kaleidoscope-roulettes,
the perceptive oracle.
Definition 8. The parametric kaleidoscope-roulette, which is a tactical game, is
called a perceptive oracle.
Thus, the perceptive oracle is a kaleidoscope-roulette if the comments are frozen
and in this case the sequence {ωn} is quasirandom. However, it may be not so
if the comments form tactical actions. In the resonances the sequence {ωn} may
have some laws. The weaker forms of relations may also appear, e.g. the integrals
Kα(ωn, ϑn, ωn−1, ϑn−1, . . . , ωn−k, ϑn−k) ≡ kα may exist for several subsequent n.
This explain the choice of the name ”perceptive oracle”. The appearing of reso-
nances is manifested by the omens [5:Rem.7]. So such omens allow to perform some
predictions in the perceptive oracle.
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Remark 11. The perceptive oracle may be regarded as a new tactical game tech-
nique and, thus, may be used for the generation of other tactical game techniques for
the computer games. For instance, it will be very intersting to combine perceptive
oracle with the conveniently generalized domino technique.
Some words should be said on other applications of the tactical perception game
formalism. Besides the phenomena of human perception such games may be used for
elaboration of man-made systems. Thus, the tactical perception games are a natural
framework for some problems of the computer vision and pattern recognition, e.g.
the dynamical formation of patterns and perception models during perception as a
result of its self-organization.
VI. Tactical interaction, tactical synthesis
and tactical localization of control systems
Note that in a tactical game the comments form a control system with the
initially fixed control algorithm (and tactical behavioral self-organization is inter-
preted as a self-developping of this algorithm). Indeed, if one consider the control
system as unity of structural and functional aspects, the generation of comments is
a structural aspect whereas their representation as parameters of evolution or in-
teractivity forms a functional aspect. Application of the tactical game formalism to
the simultaneous functioning of several control systems (their interaction, synthesis
and localization) is discussed below.
6.1. Tactical interaction of control systems. Let us consider two control
systems represented as tactical games defined by the evolution equations
ϕ˙1 = Φ1(ϕ1, ~u1;ϑ1)
and
ϕ˙2 = Φ2(ϕ2, ~u2;ϑ2)
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
u1,i = u1,i(u
◦
1,i, ϕ1, ϕ˙1, ϕ¨1, . . . ϕ
(k)
1 ; ε1,i, ϑ1)
and
u2,i = u2,i(u
◦
2,i, ϕ2, ϕ˙2, ϕ¨2, . . . ϕ
(k)
2 ; ε2,i, ϑ2).
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωj,n(~εj(τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn),
~vj,n(~u
◦
j (τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωj,n = Ωj(ωj,n−1, vj,n;ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
hold (j = 1, 2). The comments ϑ1 and ϑ2 are defined recurrently as
ϑ1,n = Θ1(ϑ1,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n)
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and
ϑ2,n = Θ2(ϑ2,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n).
The tactical interaction is realized by the addition of the interaction terms into
the recurrent formulas for ϑj to produce the interdetermination of comments:
ϑ1,n = Θ1(ϑ1,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n) + Θ˜
int
1,2(ϑ1,n−1, ϑ2,n−1, ω1,n, v1,n)
and
ϑ2,n = Θ2(ϑ2,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n) + Θ˜
int
2,1(ϑ2,n−1, ϑ1,n−1, ω2,n, v2,n).
6.2. Tactical synthesis of control systems. Let us consider N control systems
represented as tactical games defined by the evolution equations
ϕ˙j = Φj(ϕj , ~uj;ϑj)
(j = 1, 2, . . .N) with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
uj,i = uj,i(u
◦
j,i, ϕj, ϕ˙j , ϕ¨j, . . . ϕ
(k)
j ; εj,i, ϑj).
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωj,n(~εj(τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ 6tn),
~vj,n(~u
◦
j (τ), ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωj,n = Ωj(ωj,n−1, vj,n;ϕj(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
hold. The comments ϑj are defined recurrently as
ϑj,n = Θj(ϑj,n−1, ωj,n, vj,n).
The tactical synthesis is realized by the redefinition of the recurrent formulas for
ϑj to produce the unification of comments:
ϑj,n = Θ˜j(ϑ1,n−1, . . . ϑN,n−1, ω1,n, . . . , ωN,n, v1,n, . . . vN,n).
The functions Θ˜=(Θ˜1, . . . Θ˜N ) determines the synthesis. It may has various inter-
nal structure, which is characterized by the set of real arguments of functions Θ˜j
and their hierarchical structure. It presupposes that Θ˜j depend not on all triples
(ϑj , ωj, vj) and various triples may appear in Θ˜j in coalitions of different form and
nature. One may think that the functions Θ˜= (Θ˜1, . . . Θ˜N ) are constructed from
the functions Θ = (Θ1, . . .ΘN ) using some operations, which realize the synthe-
sis. Thus, the synthesis may be performed in several steps and be described by an
algorithm. Optimization problems for the synthesis and its construction naturally
arise.
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6.3. Tactical localization of control systems. Tactical localization is a proce-
dure reciprocal to the tactical synthesis. Let us consider a control system represnted
as a tactical game
ϕ˙ = Φ(ϕ, ~u;ϑ)
with ε–represented couplings of feedbacks
ui = ui(u
◦
i , ϕ, ϕ˙, ϕ¨, . . . ϕ
(k); εi, ϑ).
The integrodifferential functionals (7) have the form
ωn(~ε(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn),
~vn(~u
◦(τ), ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
and the relations (8)
ωn = Ω(ωn−1, vn;ϕ(τ)|tn−16τ6tn)
hold. The comments ϑ are defined recurrently as
ϑn = Θ(ϑn−1, ωn, vn).
To perform the tactical localization means to represent the control system as a
result of a tactical synthesis of N partial control systems.
The localization of control systems is often used to minimize the resource ex-
pences and to reduce the information circuits. The tactical localization may be
useful in this way.
Appendix A. Operative computer games
The appendix is devoted to the operative computer games and the user program-
ming of operative units in a multi-user online operative computer game.
A.1. Tactics and operative art. Operative computer games. The concept
of the operative game has its origin in the Russian tradition of military science,
where operative art is concerned as the intermediate component of military art
between tactics and strategy. Structurally, the difference between tactics and op-
erative art is that tactics investigates the controlling of the interactively controlled
systems as it was described in the main text of this article, whereas operative art
has deal with the controlling of such systems, which are simultaneously the control
ones (and their controls may be also interactive). Therefore, the operative units
are in fact the complex tactical formations.
The most natural models for the operative art are the operative computer games
(OCG), when computer is modelling the behavior of various operative units and is
functioning as the control system. The player sends interactively the commands to
the operative units, which are performed by the computer. However, a way of their
realization is not known completely to the player. For instance, the distribution of
functions between tactical units as well as tactical features of these units may be
unknown incompletely.
Note that tactics has deal with tactical units whereas the operative art has deal
with operative units, which are tactical formations.
Usually, operative units are represented as schematic non-figurative signs for
the tactical formations. Thus, the game field is realized in two different separate
views: one has, first, the observable field of figurative tactical units and, second, the
schematic field of the corresponding operative units on the screen of the monitor.
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A.2. Programming of operative units in operative computer games. It is
an interesting problem of the user programming of operative units in a multi-user
online operative computer game. Ordinarily, such game is a multi-stage one, so the
programming of operative units is done between the sets. There are two variants.
First, the game does not provide the players by any sources for such programming.
In this case an individual player should write his/her own algorithms for operative
units and then to adapt them to the game. Second, the game may include the
unified sources for the operative unit programming. For instance, it can specify
the programming language and special libraries. Certainly, the language should be
simple, close to the ordinary programming languages, compatible with them and
effective. Undoubtly, none of elaborated programming languages is not specially
adapted for the problem, however, separate features are useful. The compatibility
essentially restricts the effectiveness because known languages were not created for
the multi-user online games. However, it will be a problem of the whole computer
game community if somebody decides to include the programming of operative
units in the proposed game. I may only hope that the game “for the programmers”
will be interesting enough to compensate such social difficulties and will stimulate
a collective activity on the boundary of computer games and the programming art.
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